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THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A RETROSPECT VIEW FROM
THE CATHEDRAL
IzHAK ENGLARD*
I underline the preposition "from," as distinguished from "of," as
used in the famous and seminal paper of my esteemed colleague and
dear friend Guido Calabresi that he wrote with A. Douglas Melamed.1
What is the identity and character of that Cathedral of which one view
was given? In my critical paper on Calabresi's theory, where I made
some rather aggressive remarks, bearing witness to my then still youth-
ful impetus and fervor, I reproached him for disparaging the complex
psychological factors looming behind many legal rules, and especially
for his scanty treatment of the retributive and retaliatory function of
liability.2 I noted that: "True, in one of his articles, Calabresi claims to
present only 'one view of the Cathedral,' but views about the construc-
tions of law and normative policies are quite distinct from views about
the aesthetics of inanimate buildings." '
Here then we have a first notion of the Cathedral: the existing
law and normative policies. The Cathedral is therefore the positive
legal system dealing, in our specific context, with accidents. Hence, it
constitutes the actual law of accidents.
My retrospective view is, therefore, directed from the traditional
system towards the ideas of Calabresi, and naturally to the question of
the actual impact of The Costs of Accidents' on the law of accidents. In
the metaphorical sense of the Cathedral, I am inquiring to what ex-
tent that imposing, orthodox structure, solidly founded in the earth
and pointing to the heavens, has been changed through Calabresi's
profound architectural and statical critique? Has it been fully re-
placed by a new structure, or only partly by adding or removing
rooms? Or, has it continued unchanged, so that the one view upon it
remains unaltered?
* Justice (ret.), Supreme Court of Israel; Bora Laskin Professor (Emeritus) of Law,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral 85 HARv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
2. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort The-
ory, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-36 (1980) [hereinafter System Builders].
3. Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).
4. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
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As the astute reader will perceive immediately, my last sentence
implies a shift in perspective: the viewftom the Cathedral changed to a
view of the Cathedral. Indeed, the two perspectives are intertwined,
and given their inevitable interplay my further comments will be a
combination of both.
No doubt, the impact of The Costs of Accidents on legal scholarship
has been tremendous. The literature abounds with terms of highest
praise such as "seminal work,"5 "groundbreaking book,"6 "locus clas-
sicus,"7 "canonical source,"' "rich analysis,"9 "famous book,"'10 and
"leading contemporary account,"1 to quote a few randomly chosen
expressions of the last year or so.
I have been deeply influenced by the book to an extent that pro-
voked me to undertake a critical analysis of its foundations, a consid-
erable intellectual effort in light of the impressive and highly
sophisticated elaboration of a new theory of liability, which is basically
an economic one.12 About ten years after my initial critique, I made a
special follow-up in order to check the actual impact of Calabresi's
theory, together with that of Richard Posner, on adjudication in U.S.
law.' 3 The results were rather sobering, at least for the economics
enthusiasts. I do not put myself in this category, for I pronounced in
my first paper serious doubts about the practicability of any prescrip-
tive economic theory in adjudication because of the inevitable ab-
sence of exact data, a vital requirement for the successful
implementation of such a theory. 4 In my general critique I had some
harsh words for the two basic elements of Calabresi's theory: first,
what I have called a comprehensive functional conception of acci-
dents-the attempt to integrate all legal categories and concepts in
order to achieve the overriding goal of primary, secondary, and terti-
5. Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which Is
the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 51 (2003).
6. Alan Calnan, A Consumer-Use Approach to Products Liability, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 755,
776 n.174 (2003).
7. Larry T. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in the Law of Sales: The Article Two Statute of
Limitations, 83 B.U. L. REv. 345, 371 n.113 (2003).
8. Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Harms, " "Benefits, " and the
Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 533, 533 n.3 (2003).
9. Jason Crowell, Note, Duties of Care and the Constitution: A Negligence Model of Individ-
ual Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 473, 478 n.16 (2003).
10. Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEo. L.J. 659, 690 n.1 17 (2003).
11. John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 30 n.188 (2003).
12. See Englard, System Builders, supra note 2, at 33-36.
13. Izhak Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical Assessment of the
Theory's Impact on Courts, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1991) [hereinafter Critical Assessment].
14. E.g., Englard, System Builders, supra note 2, at 43-47.
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ary accident cost reduction; and second, the importance of general
deterrence in primary accident cost reduction.
1 5 I doubted the feasi-
bility of the first, and the reality of the second.
I would do much injustice to Calabresi by claiming that he was
not aware of the practical difficulties of his theory's implementation.
From the beginning, but especially in his later works, he insisted upon
the inherent limits of his comprehensive theory. Indeed, I wrote in
my paper on the theory's impact upon the courts:
In Calabresi's own understanding the practical role of his
theory in courts must be a rather limited one: its sophisti-
cated analysis of liability rules establishes the need for a
wealth of empirical data that in practice are unavailable to
private litigants and, therefore, to the courts. Moreover, the
instrumental nature of the theory leaves the court with the
residual, but basic, issue of justice. Finally, Calabresi's radi-
cal functional approach, which postulates the integration of
all legal means and techniques (of public and private law) in
order to achieve efficiently the rationally defined goals, re-
quires the authority of legislature. A court's legitimate crea-
tive power is necessarily limited. Calabresi, who is fully aware
of the legal process constraints imposed upon courts, clearly
considers the political lawmaking institutions as the major
implementing agencies of his general theory of accident
liability. 16
Unfortunately, the lawmaking process has its own drawbacks and pit-
falls, a point to which I will return later.
In the meantime, the scholar Calabresi became Judge Calabresi,
and thus metaphorically a part of the Cathedral, or better-a guard-
ian of it. And, indeed, as far as I can tell, he is very careful to observe
the delicate borders between the judge and the academic. I have
found in his opinions very few references to his own writings, and his
opinions generally rely heavily on the existing case law, on traditional
concepts and literature, renouncing any academic elaborations of
novel ideas, which he evidently does not lack.
I found a most interesting comment by Judge Calabresi, where he
says on the topic of "Litigation or Government Regulation?":
15. Id at 36-47. A recent paper dedicated to a similar scrutiny of the theory's impact
on courts reached an identical conclusion in relation to negligence, though exclusively
from the perspective of the Learned Hand formula and of Richard Posner's law and eco-
nomics theorizing. RonaldJ. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, 
and
Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CH.-KENT L. REv. 683, 699-704 (2002).
16. Englard, Critical Assessment, supra note 13, at 364 (footnote omitted).
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I speak to this topic today not as a judge, but as a legal
scholar. As a judge, I am perfectly happy to apply regula-
tions, and I'm perfectly happy to apply the laws that allowlitigation. In diversity cases, I will apply the laws of the vari-
ous states, no matter how absurd they are. Obstructing rules
that I disagree with, isn't my job as a judge. t7
According to Calabresi then, the judicial process cannot be used for
systematic, comprehensive, radical changes. However, in some fields
and in some very limited respects judicial lawmaking is apt to rational-ize legal results even in the framework of traditional concepts. Thus,
with regard to the complex issue of punitive damages, for a foreignlawyer a rather irrational aspect of contemporary U.S. tort law, 8Judge Calabresi has tried to put the institution on an economically
sounder basis. He says in his concurring opinion in Ciraolo v. City of
New York: 19
Punitive damages can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the
costs of its actions, and is thus appropriately deterred from
causing harm, in those categories of cases in which compen-
satory damages alone result in systematic underassessment of
costs, and hence in systematic underdeterrence.
In some circumstances, compensatory damages alone will be
enough to promote an adequate cost-benefit analysis. In
other cases, however, compensatory damages will not come
close to equaling all the costs properly attributable to the ac-
tivity. Costs may not be sufficiently reflected in compensa-
tory damages for several reasons, most of which go to the factthat not all injured parties are in fact compensated by the
responsible injurer.
... In such circumstances, additional damages, assessed inthe cases that are brought, may be an appropriate way of
making the injurer bear all the costs associated with its
activities.
17. Panel One: Litigation or Government Regulation?, in CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE
MANHATTAN INST., MANHATTAN INST. CONFERENCE SERIES No. 2, REGULATION THROUGH LITI-GATION: ASSESSING THE RoLE OF BOuNTY HUNTERS AND BUREAUCRATS IN THE AMERICAN REG-ULATORY REGIME 1, 3 (2000) (remarks ofJudge Calabresi) [hereinafter Manhattan Institute
Remarks].
18. 1 remain unconvinced by the many scholarly attempts to justify on retributive or
economic grounds the use of punitive damages. As I remarked years ago: "Thus, paradoxi-
cally the ancient combination of tort and crime, decried as a primitive state of law, is resus-
citated in the modem environment." Englard, System Builders, supra note 2, at 69.
19. 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000).
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* . .A more appropriate name for extracompensatory dam-
ages assessed in order to avoid underdeterrence might be
"socially compensatory damages." For, while traditional
compensatory damages are assessed to make the individual
victim whole, socially compensatory damages are, in a sense,
designed to make society whole by seeking to ensure that all
the costs of harmful acts are placed on the liable actor.
2 °
He then continues to explore the relationship between the retributive
and deterrent functions of extracompensatory damages:
Indeed, it would not be inappropriate to disaggregate the
retributive and deterrent functions of extracompensatory
damages altogether and allow separate awards to further the
two separate goals.... But a separate award of punitive dam-
ages would be allowed only in cases where the defendant's
conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to deserve punish-
ment apart from whatever assessment was required to com-
pensate the individual victim or society as a whole.
2
'
Here Judge Calabresi applies his theory of specific, or individual,
deterrence. As he explains in a footnote in his opinion: "This func-
tion of punitive damages renders them analogous to criminal penal-
ties that seek not to achieve a socially optimal level of activity, but to
discourage or even eliminate a particular activity altogether.
22
He then observes that in order to accomplish these goals while
preventing a windfall to the victim (and the lawyers), "it would be
preferable if such damages were paid into a fund that could then be
applied to remedy some of the unredressed social harm stemming
from the defendant's conduct."23 Judge Calabresi finally notes that
some states have adopted split-recovery legislation for just that
reason.
2 4
Eventually, the Court of Appeals in the Ciraolo case submitted to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which grants
immunity from punitive damages to municipalities, even if those dam-
ages are conceived and assessed as socially compensatory.
25
I am insisting on this example of punitive damages for a number
of reasons. First, it clearly shows the limited potential of judicial law-
20. Id. at 243-45 (Calabresi. J., concurring).
21. Id at 246 (footnote omitted) (Calabresi. J., concurring).
22. Id. at 246 n.8 (Calabresi. J., concurring).
23. Id. at 246-47 (Calabresi. J., concurring).
24. Id. at 247 (Calabresi. J., concurring).
25. Id. at 239-42 (following City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981)).
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making according to broad, monistic theories of liability. No doubt,
had Judge Calabresi won the consent of the Supreme Court, he could
have eliminated by his analysis some of the worst excesses of punitive
damages. However, it would still be a far cry from full implementation
of the comprehensive theory of liability. Thus, paying part of the
compensation into a public fund requires legislative intervention.
Moreover, it runs counter to the basic idea of corrective justice, the
starting point of individual private-law litigation. Furthermore, the at-
tempt to use private-law procedures to impose criminal-like sanctions
creates enormous (and hardly resolvable) legal problems of coordina-
tion in view of the very existence of a separate system of criminal law
and sanctions. Finally, I have always been a skeptic of general deter-
rence in the context of accident law. I have found it a kind of myth
that is not borne out by empirical evidence. Thus, for example, I do
not believe that the legal system of traffic accident compensation sub-
stantially influences the behavior of drivers or pedestrians in relation
to traffic accidents.
Another peculiar aspect of contemporary American tort law is thepopular resistance to the purely economic cost-benefit calculus that
underlies the concept of market deterrence. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co.,2 6 the Ford Pinto case, is a good example of the outcry against the
cost-benefit calculus.27 I quote again from Judge Calabresi's words:
When a defendant in a tort case, like Ford or General Mo-
tors, tells the court that it made a cost benefit analysis and,
on that basis, decided that a safety feature was not worth-
while, a jury is going to award huge punitive damages. Nojury wants to be told that safety was not the primary concern.
The public does not want to know that, in fact, we are always
deciding between life and the cost of saving life. That's the
nature of the human condition. The solution is a system
where costs are assessed and paid and nobody speaks a word
about cost benefit analysis. There is a tragic cost to being too
truthful.28
But can we really prevent being truthful?29
26. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
27. See id. at 376-78 (finding no error in the trial court's refusal to issue a jury instruc-
tion embodying the "risk-benefit" test for design defect).
28. Manhattan Institute Remarks, supra note 17, at 18.
29. For a thoughtful analysis of the Pinto case, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth ofthe FordPinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. Rv. 1013 (1991). Schwartz concludes that "the Pinto jury'sdecision that punitive damages were appropriate-a decision that was affirmed by the trialjudge and the court of appeal-raises serious questions about the operational viability of
the risk-benefit standard itself." Id at 1067.
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Finally, the legal Cathedral cannot be structured according to
one style-it is by its very essence pluralistic, composed of contrasting
parts. I have elsewhere used the fundamental idea of Niels Bohr, the
idea of complementarity, in order to conceive the structure of law.
30
Hence, notwithstanding the rational difficulty, I am in favor of com-
bining in one mental process retribution and compensation, correc-
tive and distributive justice. Rational purists may abhor pluralism of
aims and methods, but I trust that it is and will remain reality, like
human life!
We have seen the inherent limits of the judicial process. I do not
believe that legislation has a better chance to introduce the sophisti-
cated, optimal system envisaged by Calabresi in his seminal book. He
himself describes a frustrating personal experience:
I confess to be something of an idealist. As a judge, I make
decisions every day trying to make the system that we have a
better one, within the limited authority I am given. But
when we're talking here, in the presence of people who can
move and shake the system, I think we ought to think
broadly about what kind of system we want. If we don't set
our goals high enough, we will get a system that may work for
a little while but will ultimately fail.
Many years ago, I worked on a plan to reform automobile accident law
in the state of Hawaii .... I came up with a system that would have
created an adequate system of incentives without regulation. It was
not a system that put the liability on the automobile manufacturers, it
was a form of first-party system. It was going through the Hawaii legis-
lature until the trial lawyers bought a half time spot during the Super
Bowl and managed to kill it off.
31
This does not mean that we should accept all the shortcomings
and distortions of our tort system, and I am speaking universally. The
system is in crisis and is ripe for improvement. Even if I am critical of
the ambition to create a well-tempered system that optimally com-
bines the contrasting triple aims of cost reduction, I still rate highly
the illuminating analysis of The Costs of Accidents. It demonstrates the
aims of primary accident cost reduction and the impact and impor-
tance of liability insurance. On the other hand, I believe in the viabil-
ity of the fault system on the basis of corrective justice combined with
30. See Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in
Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 183, 187-88 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) ("Complementarity meant to convey the idea that the full understanding of physical
reality may require the use of contrasting, mutually exclusive models.").
31. Manhattan Institute Remarks, supra note 17, at 28.
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some ideas of distributive justice, such as distribution of risks and
deterrence.
Looking upon the American tort system from the outside as aforeigner, I find the civil jury system and punitive damages quite irra-
tional. Another peculiar feature of U.S. law is the class action in tort,
where often the initial risk distribution of very small amounts suffered
by a multitude of persons is reversed, and the full amount of damages
are imposed on the perpetrator of the wrong on the basis of the idea
of deterrence. The implementation of this system seems very costly,
and I seriously doubt its deterrent effectiveness.
To provide an additional perspective, I will offer a few words
about the Israeli accident law system. Incidentally, the scholar Guido
Calabresi is by no means unknown by the Israel judiciary. His writ-ings-including The Costs of Accidents-have been quoted and relied
upon in a number of Supreme Court decisions. 2 The impact of his
scholarly works was less in relation to the actual solution of these
cases, than in providing important insights into the workings of liabil-
ity and risk distribution.
Israel introduced in 1976 a quite progressive traffic accident com-pensation system based on absolute liability combined with compul-
sory liability and first party insurance."3 However, the law turned out
to be extremely complicated because of the difficulty in determining
what accidents were within the law's coverage. 4 The legislature inter-
vened in order to restrict liberal judicial interpretation of the statute,
and the result was unsystematic and contradictory provisions that
caused an enormous increase in litigation. 5 In many respects the law
was successful. However, if examined according to Calabresi's analy-
sis, it fails to address adequately the goal of primary accident cost re-duction, in view of the comprehensive insurance system with flat ratepremiums for specific vehicles.3 6 In other fields, such as medical mal-practice, and general accident law, the system is based on fault and
experiences the typical problems of a common-law jurisdiction (and
32. E.g., C.A. 2454/98 Lindauer v. Ringel, 56(1) P.D. 225, 227; C.A. 1845/90 Sinai v.Migdal Ins. Co., 47(5) P.D. 661, 682; C.A. 206/89, Hamutal v. Elisha Hosp. Ltd., 47(3) P.D.
805, 818.
33. See Izhak Englard, Traffic Accident Victim Compensation in Israel: A Decade of Experience
with No-Fault, in COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN SWEDEN AND OTHER COUNTRIES155, 155-58 (Carl Oldertz & Eva Tidefelt eds., 1988).
34. Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 160-61.
36. Id. at 162-64. Recently, new legislation has been introduced aimed at opening the
car insurance market to more competition, by a system called "controlled competition."See Competition in Compulsory Auto Insurance Market Gets Green Light, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 12, 2000,
available at LEXIS, ALLNWS file.
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probably to a large extent civil-law countries too): duty of care, causa-
tion, remoteness of damages (shock cases), and governmental
liability.
At one time I thought that the future would bring a more devel-
oped social security system for personal injury cases.3 7 But, the wel-
fare state seems to have reached its outer limits, the universal
tendency being to restrict benefits. Moreover, I had second thoughts
about state-administered compensation systems in view of their far
from perfect performances. It seems that in New Zealand, too, the
country that had instituted the most ambitious public-law social insur-
ance system, some changes have been introduced in order to involve
again private institutions, such as commercial insurance companies.
3
"
It seems, therefore, that we will have to continue to live with accident
law that is based on the traditional fault system, combined with private
liability insurance, with its flaws and advantages, and supplemented by
pockets of strict liability and sporadic public law schemes of
compensation.39
37. Englard, System Builders, supra note 2, at 68.
38. Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Compensation: Policy and Politics in New Zea-
land, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404, 405-06 (2000).
39. Englard, System Builders, supra note 2, at 68. For a recent critique of the coexistence
of different systems of compensation in the context of the September 11 Victim Compensa-
tion Fund, see John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds ofJustice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1027 (2003).
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